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I. INTRODUCTION
Societal anxiety regarding AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome) has increased proportionately with the heightened public
1
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awareness of the disease and its consequences. But the AIDS epi-
demic has resulted in more than mere anxiety; it has produced out-
right fear and hysteria. It was perhaps inevitable, given the fear
surrounding AIDS, that there would be a public clamor for the
testing of certain groups of individuals' for the presence of the hu-
man immunodeficiency virus (hereinafter HIV), the causative agent
of AIDS. For instance, rape victims and victim's rights advocates
have called for the mandatory HIV testing of defendants accused
of rape.2
This Note will briefly explore what is known about HIV trans-
mission, testing, and the treatment prospects of those individuals
exposed to the virus. Secondly, it will attempt to address the con-
stitutional implications of requiring rape defendants to submit to
HIV testing. In conclusion, it will examine the legislative responses
of California, New York, and West Virginia, and the recent state
and federal judicial responses to this relatively new issue.
II. HIV TRiANsMIsSION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR TREATMENT OF
HIV-INECTED INDIVIDUALS
The HIV is most commonly transmitted by one coming into con-
tact with an infected individual's blood or semen.3 Males engaging
in homosexual relations are especially susceptible to infection.4 As
a result, homosexual males have been identified as a high-risk AIDS
population, along with other groups such as intravenous drug users
and hemophiliacs.5 The general prevalence of HIV infection among
these high risk groups has been estimated to be about one in twenty.6
Despite the fact that there is not a high rate of infection among
the heterosexual population, the HIV is capable of being transmitted
1. Paul H. MacDonald, Note, AIDS, Rape and the Fourth Amendment: Schemes for Man-
datory AIDS Testing of Sex Offenders, 43 VAND. L. REy. 1607, 1608 (1990).
2. Id.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED
IMmuNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 16 (1986) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL].
4. Id. at 15.
5. Id. at 19.
6. David K. Moody, Note, AIDS and Rape: The Constitutional Dimensions of Mandatory
Testing of Sex Offenders, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 238, 241 n.23 (1990).
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via heterosexual contact.7 Although studies have suggested that re-
peated exposure to vaginal intercourse or any exposure to anal in-
tercourse increases the chances of infection, the risk of contracting
the virus from a single incident of vaginal intercourse has been es-
timated as being somewhere between 1 in 500 and 1 in 1000.8 When
this statistic is considered in conjunction with the prevalence of HIV
infection among high-risk populations, the chances of a rape victim
being infected with the virus from a single instance of vaginal in-
tercourse with a member of a high-risk group would be no worse
than 1 in 10,000. If the rapist were from a relatively low-risk cat-
egory, in which the prevalence rate was 1 in 10,000, the risk of
exposure to the victim would be about 1 in 5,000,000.
When an individual is infected by the HIV, the body reacts via
seroconversion: it produces antibodies to combat the infection.9 The
two most common methods of testing in order to determine whether
an individual is infected are the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA) and the Western Blot. 0 These tests detect the body's for-
mation of antibodies to the virus; they do not detect the presence
of the virus itself." As a result, these tests are inherently inexact
because there is a period of time between exposure and serocon-
version where both tests will yield a negative result. 2 The lack of
precision results in the possibility that an individual, although he
tests negative because seroconversion has not occurred, could be
infected and fully capable of transmitting the disease.
Although there are rare cases where an individual will not ser-
oconvert for a year or longer following infection, 3 in nearly all cases
antibodies to HIV can be detected within two months. 4 Some pa-
7. SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 3, at 14.
8. Moody, supra note 6, at 241.
9. MacDonald, supra note 1, at 1612.
10. Klaus Mayer & Johanna Pindyck, The Safety of Blood and Blood Products, in AIDS:
ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, AND PREVENTION, 377 (Vincent T. DeVita, Jr. et al. eds., 2d ed.
1988) [hereinafter AIDS].
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
13. MacDonald, supra note 1, at 1612.
14. Robert Yarchoan & James M. Pluda, Clinical Aspects of Infection with AIDS Retrovirus:
Acute HIV Infection, Persistent Generalized Lymphadenopathy, and AIDS-R elated Complex, in AIDS,
supra note 10, at 110.
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tients seroconvert within two weeks after being exposed. 15 The prob-
lem of precision in testing is slightly exacerbated by a high incidence
of false positives built into the system as a result of both ELISA
and the Western Blot originally being designed to test for the pres-
ence of HIV in donated blood. 6 Neither test was designed to de-
termine whether a specific individual is an HIV carrier. 17 However,
when an ELISA test is supplemented with a confirming Western
Blot, the joint false positive rate is less than one in 100,000.18
The prognosis of someone infected with the HIV is grim. Al-
though almost no cases of AIDS occur in adults during the first
two years after infection, 9 it is now believed that anywhere from
25% to 35% of HIV infected persons will develop full-blown AIDS
within seven years of exposure. 20 It is further expected that the mor-
tality rate of whose who become infected with the virus will ap-
proach 100% unless effective treatments are found. 21
Although not cures, zidovudine (AZT) and dideoxyinosine (DDI)
are the only drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration
for the purpose of controlling HIV production. 22 While the ultimate
effectiveness of DDI is still uncertain, AZT has been found to induce
immunologic and clinical improvements in patients with severe HIV
infection. 23 But treatment with AZT has its drawbacks. Patients have
complained of numerous side effects associated with AZT treatment
such as nausea, muscle pain, insomnia, and severe headaches. 24 Ad-
15. Id.
16. Mayer & Pindyck, supra note 10, at 377.
17. Moody, supra note 6, at 241.
18. James R. Allen, Screening and Testing Asymptomatic Persons for HIV Infection, in AIDS,
supra note 10, at 424.
19. James J. Goedert & William A. Blattner, The Epidemiology and Natural History of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, in AIDS, supra note 10, at 48.
20. George M. Shaw et al., Etiology of AIDS: Virology, Molecular Biology, and Evolution of
Human Immunodeficiency Viruses, in AIDS, supra note 10, at 11.
21. Id.
22. Malcolm Gladwell, Second AIDS Drug Given Conditional Approval; FDA Allows Sale on
Basis of Incomplete Tests; Final Evaluation Expected Next Spring, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1991
at A-4. Robert Yarchoan & Samuel Broder, Pharmacologic Treatment of HIV Infection, in AIDS,
supra note 10, at 277; see also Gina Kolata, U.S. Halves Dosage for AIDS Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 1990, at B6.
23. Yarchoan & Broder, supra note 22, at 277.
24. Moody, supra note 6, at 242.
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ditionally, AZT is toxic - it suppresses bone marrow production,
leaving the AIDS patient almost defenseless against bacterial infec-
tionsY AZT treatment is also expensive: the annual cost to an AIDS
patient has been estimated at over $3,000.26
Nevertheless AZT is now routinely prescribed to treat those HIV
carriers who are asymptomatic, as well as those with advanced
AIDS. 27 The reason for this widespread use of AZT is the August
1989 National Institute of Health (NIH) proclamation that AZT can
delay the onset of AIDS in some asymptomatic individuals. 28 Five
months later, the NIH advised cutting the recommended dosage in
half, ameliorating the problems associated with the side effects and
the expense of the drug.29
But prescribing AZT to treat those persons infected with the HIV
provides only a temporary stay of execution for what is effectively
a death sentence. Merely delaying the onset of AIDS symptoms is
an unsatisfactory solution to the problems posed by a disease that
insidiously robs human beings of their bodies' ability to fight off
a host of deadly infections. Nothing short of a complete cure can
or should be good enough to satisfy a society which has been so
profoundly touched by this deadly epidemic.
III. TiE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SUBMITTING RAPE
DEFENDANTS TO MANDATORY HIV TESTING
Defendants resisting attempts by the rape victim to compel them
to be tested for the HIV may base their opposition upon two grounds.
One available defense is that the drawing of blood from their bodies
for the purpose of informing the victim of their HIV status is vi-
olative of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
25. Yarchoan & Broder, supra note 22, at 282.
26. Moody, supra note 6, at 242-43.
27. Id. at 243.
28. Id. at 243 (citing AIDS CLINICAL TRIAL STUDY GROUP, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY
AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, PROTOCOL 019 (August 31, 1989)).
29. Id. (citing Gina Kolata, U.S. Halves Dosage for AIDS Drug, N.Y. Tams, Jan. 17, 1990,
at B6).
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searches and seizures. Secondly, the defendant may assert that the
involuntary testing and subsequent release of the results offends his
general constitutional "right to privacy."
A. The Fourth Amendment "Search and Seizure" Issue
The Fourth Amendment affirms "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures . "..."30 The United States Supreme
Court has held that a compulsory blood test is a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.3' Simply because a particular
governmental action is considered a search, howeveri does not mean
that it is unconstitutional; the search must also be unreasonable.32
The reasonableness of a particular search is ascertained by balancing
the extent of a state's intrusion on an individual's privacy interests
against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.33 This
balancing test has been applied by the Court in three contexts. A
search is said to either further law enforcement aims, implement
administrative regulations, or fulfill some "special need." 34
Law enforcement searches are conducted in the context of crim-
inal investigations for the purpose of gathering evidence to be used
in prosecutions.35 Such searches must generally be conducted pur-
suant to the issuance of a warrant based upon probable cause.16
Administrative searches have arisen in the context of enforcing
a regulatory health or safety code.37 Such searches are usually held
to the same standard as those relating to law enforcement, that is,
a prior warrant based upon probable cause is required. 8 However,
if governmental regulation of the entity being searched is pervasive,
the added invasiveness occasioned by the search may be adjudged
30. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
31. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
34. Moody, supra note 6, at 247.
35. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976).
36. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
37. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
38. Id. at 534.
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so minimal as to justify its occurrence absent a warrant. 9 In the
event of a warrantless search, the probable cause requirement is
fulfilled by the presence of reasonable administrative guidelines reg-
ulating the conduct of searches in general and a showing that the
guidelines have been followed in the particular case.40
A third type of search that neither aids law enforcement nor
helps implement regulatory schemes has been recognized by the Su-
preme Court. These searches, termed "special needs" searches, can
justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause re-
quirements associated with law enforcement and administrative
searches.
The "special needs" doctrine was first recognized by the Supreme
Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O.41 The Court held that an assistant
principal's warrantless search of a student's purse on the grounds
that she was suspected of smoking cigarettes did not violate the
student's constitutional rights when marijuana was found instead. 42
Upon balancing the state's interest in maintaining an environment
in its schools conducive to learning against the student's legitimate
privacy interest in the contents of her purse,43 the Court held that
the state's interest prevailed. The warrantless search was reasonable,
despite being conducted on somewhat less than probable cause, be-
cause of the "special need" of school administrators to prevent "drug
use and violent crime in the schools." 44
The Supreme Court extended the "special needs" doctrine to
include not only searches of effects, but also warrantless searches
of persons in the companion cases of Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association4 5 and National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab.46 At issue in Skinner was the Secretary of Transpor-
tation's promulgation of an alcohol and drug testing program for
39. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981).
40. Moody, supra note 6, at 248.
41. 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 333.
43. Id. at 340.
44. See id. at 339.
45. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
46. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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railroad employees in response to the high incidence of substance
abuse and serious alcohol and drug related accidents involving rail-
road personnel.47 All employees associated with a major train ac-
cident, 48 an impact accident, 49 or an incident involving a fatality to
an on-duty railroad employee 0 were required to undergo drug test-
ing. Von Raab involved a drug testing program similar to that in
Skinner. The Treasury Department mandated drug testing as a pre-
condition to employment or promotion for all customs officials who
would be required to either carry a gun, be involved in drug in-
terdiction, or be exposed to classified information.5 1
The Court upheld both testing programs as being reasonable
Fourth Amendment searches under the "special needs" doctrine. In
Skinner, the prevention of a potential threat to human life posed
by drug use among railroad employees was a "special need. ' 5 2 The
"special need" in Von Raab involved the compelling governmental
interest in preventing drug users from attaining positions that could
endanger the nation's border integrity or citizen's lives. 3 As a result
of these decisions, railroad employees and customs officials could
be tested for the presence of drugs despite the lack of individualized
suspicion of drug use surrounding any particular employee or of-
ficial. This concept was stated explicitly in Skinner as the Court
declared that "a showing of individualized suspicion is not a con-
stitutional floor. ' 54
The significance of the Court's allowing drug testing of persons
absent individualized suspicion is in its rejection of the notion that
a showing of probable cause prior to a search is mandated by the
Constitution.5 5 Probable cause had always been a component of
search and seizure analysis in its original law enforcement context
and the requirement of some likelihood that "what was being
47. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1989).
48. Id. at 609.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1989).
52. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
53. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679.
54. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
55. Moody, supra note 6, at 250.
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searched for would be found' 56 survived the Court's expansion of
Fourth Amendment search doctrine into the administrative searches
area.
Instead, the Court in Skinner set forth three conditions which
must be fulfilled in order to consider a search reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. First, the privacy interests im-
plicated by the search must be minimal;17 second, the government
interest must be important;58 lastly, the circumstances must be such
that a requirement of individualized suspicion would place the gov-
ernment interest in jeopardy. 9
In applying this criteria to the facts in Skinner and Von Raab,
the Court held the tests on bodily fluids necessary to implement the
testing programs were minimal intrusions into the employees' rea-
sonable expectations of privacy.60 The important government interest
in Skinner was in having only drug-free employees piloting the na-
tion's railroads, given the potentially disastrous consequences of the
alternative. 6' In Von Raab, the government had a "compelling" in-
terest in ensuring the physical fitness of its interdiction personnel
on the front lines of the drug war. 62 Finally, the Court held in Skin-
ner that, because of the hidden nature of drug impairment, requiring
the government to suspect that a particular employee was impaired
prior to being able to test her would jeopardize the government
interest at stake. 63 Curiously, although a similar rationale would seem
appropriate to the situation in Von Raab, the Court did not explicitly
apply the third part of the test that they had just announced in
Skinner.64
56. Id. at 251.
57. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 628; See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671. The Von Raab court, rather than concentrating
on the privacy interests implicated by perinatal invasion, emphasized the "diminished expectations"
of privacy associated with certain forms of government employment, such as Mint employees who
routinely find themselves subject to personal searches. Since these cases were decided at the same
time, it is reasonable to believe that the court implicitly found the same minimal privacy intrusion
applied to both tests on bodily fluids.
61. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
62. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670.
63. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
64. Moody, supra note 6, at 252.
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Compulsory HIV testing of rape defendants might also be an-
alyzed under the "special needs" doctrine if, like employee drug
testing, it could be shown that HIV testing neither aided law en-
forcement nor furthered a regulatory scheme. 6
State statutes allowing the testing of alleged rapists have barred
prosecutors from using any information obtained from the testing
as part of a charging decision66 or as part of a criminal trial.67 Since
law enforcement searches are conducted for the purpose of gathering
evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions 6 8 statutes barring such
uses of the searches they authorize are not related to law enforce-
ment. 69
Mandatory HIV testing programs cannot currently be classified
as administrative searches either, as the Supreme Court has applied
the administrative search analysis only to searches of buildings, not
people.70 Obviously, the drawing of blood necessary to conduct a
test for the HIV is a search of the person.
Since HIV testing neither aids in the gathering of evidence for
law enforcement purposes nor furthers an administrative scheme, it
is likely that such testing would be subjected to Fourth Amendment
search and seizure analysis under the "special needs" doctrine. HIV
testing in that respect is similar to the Skinner and Von Raab drug
testing cases which have already been decided by the Court. 7'
Given the Court's willingness to dispose of the probable cause
requirement in upholding mandatory drug testing, it is not a far
reach to suggest that suspicionless HIV tests could be construed as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In order for a rape de-
fendant to successfully resist a request by the victim to undergo HIV
testing, it will be necessary for him to show that the intrusion upon
his privacy occasioned by the test is something more than "minimal"
65. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(a) (Deering Supp. 1991).
67. See, e.g., id. § 1524.1(k).
68. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
69. Moody, supra note 6, at 253.
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 45-64 and accompanying text.
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or that the governmental interest in having him tested is something
less than "important." Proving that either one of those conditions
exist would theoretically be enough for the court to deny the victim's
request; 72 it would assuredly be enough if the privacy intrusion was
more than minimal and the government interest was less than im-
portant.
But what about the scenario where the privacy intrusion is more
than minimal and the government interest is important? An intrusion
which is no longer minimal should resolve the case in favor of the
individual's privacy interest. However, it is highly questionable
whether a court would defeat a sufficiently important government
interest in the face of an intrusion into individual privacy that was
only somewhat more than minimal. In a situation where a court
feels constrained to rule in favor of the government, it might take
pains to classify the privacy intrusion as "minimal", regardless of
its actual intrusiveness. It is not implausible to suggest that a court
engaging in this type of surreptitious analysis will decide a case in
favor of the government where they may have to admit that the
privacy intrusion is more than minimal; the court might simply add
that other considerations of fairness and justice support their hold-
ing.
Therefore, the resolution of the question whether compulsory
HIV testing of rape defendants is constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment may well ultimately turn on the more traditional search
and seizure analysis of whether the governmental interest in con-
ducting the testing outweighs the individual interest in privacy.
B. The Constitutional "Right to Privacy" Issue
Although never explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the Su-
preme Court has held that a constitutional right to privacy exists
"in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action. ' 73 Once a right has been determined
to be fundamental, the statute limiting that right can only be jus-
72. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
73. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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tified by a compelling state interest, and the statute must be narrowly
tailored to effect only the compelling interest at stake.74
The Supreme Court, in Whalen v. Roe,7 identified two privacy
interests deserving protection under the Constitution: the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters76 and the inde-
pendence interest in making certain kinds of important decisions.
As to the latter, the Court has limited its definition of "important"
decisions to those relating to marriage, 78 procreation, 79 contracep-
tion,80 family relationships,8 ' and child rearing and education. 2
In matters of disclosure, the Court has "implicitly established a
two-part test for determining whether the privacy interest in non-
disclosure is implicated: first, the information disclosed must be of
a peculiarly private nature; and second, the information must be
disclosed beyond government officials."" A simple application of
this test was illustrated in New York v. Ferber.84 In that case, the
Court had to decide whether children who had been depicted in
pornographic films and pictures possessed a constitutionally pro-
tected privacy right in nondisclosure. The Court found that such a
right existed, as the children's nudity was peculiarly private, and the
depictions of their bodies were distributed for commercial use.8
74. Id. at 155.
75. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
76. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 79 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring); id.
at 78 (Powell, J., concurring); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); id. at 599 n.25 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 600 n.26 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)).
78. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
79. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
80. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); id. at 460, 463-65 (White, J.,
concurring in result)).
81. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
82. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
83. Moody, supra note 6, at 261.
84. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
85. Id. at 759 n.10.
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It is difficult to imagine anything more "peculiarly private" than
the results of an individual's HIV test. Therefore, the first test for
"fundamentalness" is satisfied. As for the scope of the disclosure,
any testing scheme which purports to release the results of the de-
fendant's HIV status to the victim necessarily requires that this in-
formation be accessible to persons other than government officials.
Clearly then, the individual's privacy right in the nondisclosure of
his HIV status appears to be a fundamental interest which is required
to be justified by a compelling government interest. Further, even
if the government's interest is indeed adjudged to be compelling,
conditions governing any disclosure of the individual's HIV status
must be carefully drawn to effect only the fulfillment of that interest.
Unfortunately, this view has yet to find any support within the
federal court system. In Local 1812, American Federation of Gov-
ernment Employees v. Department of State,86 the district court con-
sidered a Department of State policy implementing periodic
mandatory HIV testing of its employees assigned to the Foreign
Service. Upon consideration of the invasion of privacy argument
put forth by the employees, the court declined to identify any sub-
stantial privacy interest other than the damaging psychological reac-
tions of a "deep personal nature ' 87 accompanying a positive test
result. It was the court's opinion that these concerns alone were not
sufficient to raise constitutional privacy issues.88
C. Identifying the Competing Interests
Regardless of whether the question of compulsory HIV testing
of rape defendants is subjected to Fourth Amendment search and
seizure analysis (where the government's interest in disclosure is bal-
anced against the individual's privacy interest in nondisclosure) or
Fourteenth Amendment "right to privacy" analysis (where the gov-
ernment's interest in disclosure must be shown to be compelling in
order to intrude upon the individual's fundamental right to privacy
in nondisclosure), it is necessary to identify the interests of both the
86. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
87. Id. at 53.
88. Id.
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government and the individual for the purpose of evaluating their
importance.
1. The Government's Interest in Testing and Disclosure
There are primarily two justifications posited in support of ex-
posure-based 89 HIV testing, typified by the Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia's holding in Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court.90 The first
assertion is that HIV testing helps to allay the fears of one who has
potentially been exposed to the virus. 91 In addition to the supposed
psychological benefit, disclosure of the HIV test results to the victim
is said to provide the victim and her physicians with information
allowing them to assess the proper course of medical treatment more
accurately. 92
Undoubtedly, anxiety over possibly being infected with the HIV
is assuaged when an individual discovers that the person she fears
has infected her has tested negative for the antibody,93 despite the
possibility of a "false" result. But it is important to remember that
current means of HIV testing are ineffective in identifying infected
persons who have yet to form the antibody. Professor Steven Ei-
senstat has stated that
Exposure testing must not be promoted as a means of allaying the fears of the
individual fearing infection; a negative test result would only encourage a false
sense of security, and would thus increase the risk of further transmission ....
Exposure testing also operates against the public health by creating a false sense
of security. In this manner, it actually increases the risk of further contagion.9
89. Exposure-based testing implicates the desirability of testing a person for the presence of
HIV antibodies when there is individualized reason to believe that the particular person has been
exposed to the virus. It is to be distinguished from group-based testing, which involves testing a
particular class of persons to discover whether any might be infected. In group-based testing, there
is no particular reason to believe that any individual member of the group has been exposed to the
virus.
90. 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1990).
91. Id. at 672.
92. Id.
93. Steven Eisenstat, An Analysis of the Rationality of Mandatory Testing for the HIV An-
tibody: Balancing the Governmental Public Health Interest with the Individual's Privacy Interest, 52
U. Pirr. L. REv. 327, 358 (1991).
94. Id. at 358-59.
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In short, because of the less than complete reliability of HIV
testing, and because of the "window" of time between exposure and
the development of HIV antibodies, a person who allows the news
that her assailant has tested HIV-negative to "allay her fears" does
so unreasonably. Since the psychological benefit accruing to the per-
son from learning the test results is largely illusory, states relying
solely on that basis would likely fail in showing a governmental
interest important or compelling enough to justify compulsory HIV
testing.
Professor Eisenstat makes the above point in the context of de-
ciding whether persons who have exposed medical and public safety
personnel to their blood should be subjected to HIV testing. He
concedes, however, that "the testing of individuals charged with or
convicted of the crime of rape . . may represent a rational public
health policy." 95 He suggests that the unique circumstances of rape
victims may provide sufficient justification for compulsory testing.
Two factors distinguish the testing of rape defendants from other forms of ex-
posure testing. First, a victim of rape is faced with possible infection due to truly
unavoidable circumstances. Medical and public safety personnel .. by virtue of
their career choices, have to a certain extent agreed to assume those risks as-
sociated with their professions. Second, [the fear of HIV infection] when com-
pounded with the trauma attending the rape itself, further distinguishes the level
of anxiety suffered by the rape victim ....
Unquestionably, empathy for the innocent victim of a violent
crime such as rape could motivate a court to do something that it
perceives might help the victim. However, as illustrated by the above
discussion, attempting to allay the victim's fears is a fruitless en-
deavor due to the shortcomings of the available diagnostic tests for
the virus.97 The two factors that a rape victim would find relevant
in deciding whether her fears should be allayed, because of their
absolute nature, admit of only four possibilities. Either the defen-
dant did or did not rape the victim, and the defendant will either
test positive or negative for HIV. If the defendant did not rape the
victim, the result of his HIV test is, in actuality, irrelevant. It is
95. Id. at 370.
96. Id. at 370-71.
97. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
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certainly possible that the victim could believe that the defendant
was her assailant (and thus a negative test result would in fact allay
her fears), but if the defendant was truly innocent any subsidence
in the victim's fears would have no basis in reality. If the defendant
did rape the victim and tests positive, the victim's fears will be ex-
acerbated instead of allayed despite the long odds against the in-
fection actually being transmitted during the rape; furthermore, a
false positive result will inflict needless fear and worry upon the
victim. If the defendant did rape the victim and subsequently tests
negative, the victim is subject to the false sense of security described
earlier by virtue of the inexactness of the testing procedures.98 "[HIV
testing] doesn't really change the risk of the situation. It only changes
the perception of the risk." 99
Professor Eisenstat suggests that the level of anxiety suffered by
the rape victim justifies the mandatory testing of the defendant. He
argues that the fear of infection is "compounded" with the trauma
of the rape.' °° Professor Eisenstat offers no evidence, however, that
these dual psychological "injuries" are synergistic. 101 If the fear of
infection is assigned an "anxiety burden" value of x, and the trauma
from the rape itself is assigned a value of y, it is unclear whether
the total anxiety will amount to some synergistic value approaching
a maximum of xy which would be greater than the cumulative value
ofx + y.
A hypothetical example may serve to further illustrate the point.10 2
Suppose that there are two nurses in a hospital. Suppose further
that one is sexually assaulted while on duty and the other is exposed
to a needle stick, and that both fear contracting the HIV as a result.
According to Professor Eisenstat, the nurse that was assaulted should
be more anxious over the fear of HIV infection alone since this fear
has been compounded by the manner of her potential exposure.
98. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
99. Eisenstat, supra note 93, at 361 (quoting Florida Legislation Would Provide Procedures
for Medical Workers, 5 Aids Policy & The Law (BNA) No. 11, at 2 (June 13, 1990)).
100. Id. at 371.
101. See generally id. at 370-72.
102. The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Jeff L. Lewin, Professor of Law
at West Virginia University, for his assistance in formulating this hypothetical.
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But let us suppose that both the patient whose blood was left
in the needle and the assailant were tested for HIV and both tests
were negative. If Professor Eisenstat's theory is correct, the rape
victim should still be experiencing greater anxiety since her anxiety
was greater to start with. Since there is no apparent reason to dif-
ferentiate between the likelihood that either result is more reliable
than the other on its face, it is not at all clear that the assaulted
nurse should be more worried about contracting HIV than the nurse
who was exposed to the needle. Furthermore, if the assaulted nurse
is in fact more traumatized by the possibility of HIV exposure, it
is likely an irrational fear on her part; while the assaulted nurse
suffered, no doubt, great trauma at the hands of her attacker, any
further trauma from possible HIV exposure should be no greater
than the experience by the nurse who was stuck with the needle.
If it is indeed the case that the burden is cumulative instead of
synergistic, then it can be argued that there are already societal me-
chanisms in place, such as counseling centers and public mental health
clinics, to assist the victim of a rape in dealing with the psychological
trauma associated with being raped. Courts are inadequate substi-
tutes, however admirable their motivation, for those institutions al-
ready specializing in ameliorating mental and psychological anxieties
resulting from sexual assault.
This leaves in isolation the fear of infection, which cannot be
distinguished from the same fear experienced by medical or safety
personnel who may have been exposed to the HIV. As explained
earlier, ordering HIV testing of a potential carrier for the purpose
of allaying such fears is counterproductive, in that a false sense of
security may accompany a false negative result.
Along with the psychological benefits supposedly accruing to the
potentially infected by virtue of having her fears allayed, those seek-
ing to justify exposure-based HIV testing assert that disclosure of
the accused's HIV test results to the victim provides her with the
information needed "to commence treatment prior to the time they
would be able to ascertain their own HIV status if the subject tests
positive." 103
103. Eisenstat, supra note 93, at 364.
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However, treatment options are limited. There is currently no
treatment that will succeed in removing the HIV from a person's
body once that person has been infected.'04 In some cases AZT will
succeed in delaying the onset of AIDS symptoms, but it is only
necessary to commence AZT treatment prior to the onset of symp-
toms.105 Since symptoms rarely develop until years subsequent to the
exposure, waiting the few months necessary to confirm one's own
seropositivity will not adversely affect any available treatment op-
tion.1°0 Additionally, commencing immediate AZT treatment on the
basis of the defendant's having tested HIV-positive raises "serious
medical concerns" since AZT treatment is itself not without risk. 107
Professor Eisenstat, while contending that "[n]either of the two
reasons advanced to support exposure testing provide a valid jus-
tification for the testing", 108 offers an assessment of the true mo-
tivation behind the desire of legislatures in implementing mandatory
HIV testing. "The primary motivation behind the enactment of these
types of statutes would appear to be a popular or legislative desire
to somehow assist those individuals [who] ... are faced with an
unavoidable exposure .... 109 [tihus, while laudable in intent, ex-
posure testing provides only an elusive security to those fearing in-
fection."110
2. The Individual's Privacy Interest in Nondisclosure
Since the courts evaluate the extent of the intrusion upon an
individual as well as the importance of the governmental interests
in determining constitutional privacy questions,"' an examination of
the intrusiveniess upon individual privacy of a public health measure
such as mandatory HIV testing is appropriate.
104. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
105. Eisenstat, supra note 93, at 360.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 359.
108. Id. at 360.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 364.
111. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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If the governmental interests furthered are minimal, but the privacy intrusion is
slight as well, such a measure may still be deemed rational. However, when a
program both fails to effectuate the purposes which underlie its implementation,
and simultaneously intrudes significantly upon the privacy of the individuals it
affects, the program is not rational and should not be adopted. 12
It has been said that testing positive for the HIV is the equivalent
of receiving a death sentence;"' the medical implication of a positive
HIV test result is that the individual will ultimately die from AIDS.
By consenting to HIV testing, the individual has agreed to accept
the life and death implications of the test. But to require the in-
dividual to submit to the test is to compel him or her to confront
the prospect of a painful and ultimately fatal disease. In taking away
the right of when to face such a prospect, compulsory testing im-
poses an extremely invasive intrusion upon an individual."14
The societal implications of a positive HIV result also signifi-
cantly affect the individual's privacy interests. Since test results may
be disclosed to persons other than the test subject and his physician
(and such disclosure is precisely the intent of testing rape defen-
dants), the risk of unauthorized disclosures, both unintentional and
deliberate, increases." 5
Additionally, the nonconsensual disclosure of HIV test results to
third parties constitutes a significant privacy invasion in that it ex-
poses the subject to the extensive forms of discrimination currently
leveled against HIV-infected persons. As a result of these biases,
seropositive individuals continue to experience discrimination when
seeking employment, medical treatment, housing, and life and health
insurance." 6 Even with the increasing statutory protections being af-
forded HIV-positive individuals, these persons still face a panoply
of discriminatory acts. " 7
112. Eisenstat, supra note 93, at 364-65.
113. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 679-80 (Ct. App. 1990).
114. Eisenstat, supra note 93, at 365.
115. Id. at 365-66.
116. Id. at 366.
117. Id. at 367. Professor Eisenstat lists examples of such discrimination as the refusal of phy-
sicians and dentists to treat HIV infected persons, various forms of employment discrimination, in-
accessibility to and eviction from rental housing, and the denial or cancellation of health and life
insurance coverage. Id.
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D. Applying the Law to the Identifiable Interests
Under Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis, in order
for a search to be reasonable, the governmental interest in con-
ducting the search must outweigh the individual's interest in pri-
vacy.118 As shown above, the alleged governmental interests in
ordering compulsory HIV testing of rape defendants are largely per-
ceived, and not real.119 Conversely, it has been shown that the in-
dividual's privacy interests are both very real and very significant. 20
Therefore, ordering an accused rapist to undergo compulsory HIV
testing so that the results can be released to the victim is likely an
unconstitutional search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
The right-to-privacy argument appears to be even stronger. By
compulsory testing, an individual's fundamental interest in main-
taining privacy concerning his HIV status is implicated.12' The gov-
ernmental interest in conducting that test and disclosing the results
must be compelling.122 The typical governmental interests asserted
in defense of compulsory HIV testing appear to fall far short of
that standard, and, as a result, compulsory testing would likely in-
fringe upon the accused's right to privacy.
IV. MANDATORY TESTING OF RAPE DEFENDANTS: THE
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES
State legislatures have begun to react to the question of man-
datory HIV testing in a multitude of contexts and, via these statutory
schemes, have expressed a preference for protecting the concerns of
either the rape victim or the accused. California and New York,
two states with a high incidence of AIDS cases and HIV infection
among their population, 23 have reacted to the problem in opposite
manners. California expresses a clear preference for the concerns of
the victim; New York mandates a high level of protection of the
118. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 89-110 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
123. Goedert & Blattner, supra note 19, at 39.
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privacy interests of the accused. West Virginia's statutory solution
appears to fall somewhere in between the California and New York
approaches.
A few courts have addressed the issue as well. Two cases have
been decided in New York; one case was decided prior to the passage
of that state's testing statutes, 124 while the other was decided sub-
sequently. 15 The question has yet to come before either the Cali-
fornia or West Virginia courts, but in Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Roberts,1 26 the United States Court for the District of the
Virgin Islands squarely confronted the matter.
The first purpose of this section is to briefly examine the Cal-
ifornia, New York, and West Virginia legislative approaches to the
question of allowing mandatory HIV testing of rape defendants and
to ascertain the likelihood of their constitutionality. Next, it will
examine the judicial response to the issue and evaluate the rationale
and arguments supporting the holdings of these courts.
A. The Legislative Response
1. The California Approach
An expansion of California's penal code was that state's first
attempt to provide for the HIV testing of rape defendants.1 27 The
statute empowers the state courts, at the written request of the vic-
tim, 28 to issue a search warrant to commence HIV testing when
probable cause exists to believe both that the accused committed the
offense and that the accused has transferred to the victim blood,
semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV. 29
Upon receipt of the test results, the state may then release them to
the victim, 13 0 who in turn may disclose the test results as he or she
124. People v. Thomas, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Co. Ct. 1988).
125. People v. Durham, 553 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
126. 756 F. Supp. 898 (D.V.I. 1991).
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1 (Deering Supp. 1991).
128. Id. § 1524.1(b)(1).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 1524.1(g).
1991]
21
Franks: Mandatory HIV Testing of Rape Defendants: Constitutional Rights a
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
deems necessary to protect his or her health and safety or the health
and safety of his or her family or sexual partner.'
The voters of California later approved an initiative, Proposition
96, which became an addition to the state's health and safety code.3 2
The requirements that the victim's request be written' and that
probable cause exists 34 are essentially the same as those found in
the Penal Code.
Despite the declared purpose of California to protect the health
and safety of its citizens135 and the Supreme Court's affirmation that
such a purpose is a compelling state interest, 136 the mandatory HIV
testing of rape defendants does not serve that purpose. Such testing
does not further the victim's psychological health insofar as she relies
upon the inherently inexact results to make conclusions about her
own likelihood of infection. 137 Neither does such testing further the
victim's physical health by presenting her with viable treatment op-
tions that must be commenced immediately. 38 Since the privacy in-
terests of the defendant in nondisclosure are so deeply implicated, 13 9
it would appear that the California statutes are unconstitutional.
2. The New York Approach
New York's legislative intent as expressed in their HIV testing
statute'40 is directly opposed to that of California. According to the
New York legislature, "maximum confidentiality protection for in-
formation related to [HIV] infection and [AIDS] is an essential pub-
lic health measure .... [Sitrong confidentiality protections can limit
the risk of discrimination and the harm to an individual's interest
in privacy that unauthorized disclosure of HIV related information
131. Id. § 1524.1(i).
132. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 199.95-.99 (Deering 1990).
133. Id. § 199.96.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 199.95.
136. Moody, supra note 6, at 254-55.
137. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
140. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2780 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
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can cause .... ",14i The statute provides that no person can order
an HIV test without the written, informed consent of the subject
of the test. 142 The statute also provides strict penalties for persons
who order HIV tests or disclose information contained in an au-
thorized test. Such persons may be fined up to five thousand dollars
for each occurrence, 43 and a willful violation is a misdemeanor.' 44
A New York court may order disclosure of HIV-related infor-
mation upon a showing of a compelling need relating to the ad-
judication of a criminal or civil proceeding. 145 Disclosure may also
be appropriate if a clear and imminent danger to an unknowing
individual's life or health 46 or the public's health 47 exists as a result
of contact with the test subject.1 48 Upon assessing compelling need
or clear and imminent danger, a court must weigh the need for
disclosure against the privacy interest of the protected individual and
the public interest disserved by disclosure. 49 Since the constitutional
standards regarding searches and invasions of privacy5 ° are built
into the statute, thereby guaranteeing that the rights of the individual
will be fully protected, the New York legislation would likely with-
stand constitutional scrutiny.
3. The West Virginia Approach
West Virginia's "AIDS-related Medical Testing and Records
Confidentiality Act' '1 51 strikes a balance between the victim- con-
scious California approach and the defendant-conscious New York
approach. Whereas California allows testing of persons merely ac-
141. Id. Historical and statutory notes.
142. Id. § 2781(1).
143. Id. § 2783(1)(b).
144. Id. § 2783(2).
145. Id. § 2785(2)(a).
146. Id. § 2785(2)(b).
147. Id. § 2785(2)(c).
148. Id. § 2785(2)(d). Section 2785(2)(d) provides that a disclosure order may also be procured
by any person (presumably a government official) who is lawfully entitled to the disclosure provided
that the disclosure is consistent with the provisions of the article.
149. Id. § 2785(5).
150. See supra discussion in text following note 72; see also supra note 83 and accompanying
text.
151. W. VA. CODE §§ 16-3C-1 to -9 (1991).
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cused of rape, 52 and New York proscribes all HIV testing absent
written consent, 153 West Virginia will mandate testing only upon con-
viction for rape. 154 While West Virginia's civil penalties for disclosing
HIV testing information to unauthorized persons 55 are more severe
than California's, 156"New York has taken the added step of imposing
criminal sanctions. 57
Because West Virginia imposes involuntary HIV testing only upon
those convicted of rape, and convicted felons arguably have a di-
minished expectation of privacy compared to the public at large, 151
the West Virginia AIDS testing statute likely passes constitutional
muster. But a diminished expectation of privacy is not the same as
no expectation at all. It is very difficult to imagine a situation where
a victim of sexual assault could gain much utility from having her
convicted attacker tested, since the period of time required for the
victim's own seroconversion 59 would almost always surpass the
amount of time that passes between arrest and conviction.
B. The Judicial Response
1. People v. Thomas and People v. Durham: Before and
After New York's HIV Testing Statute
Prior to the enactment of New York's HIV testing statute, the
Schoharie County Court had an opportunity to address the man-
datory testing issue in People v. Thomas 60 The defendant in this
case was indicted on two counts each of rape, sodomy, and sexual
abuse (all in the first degree) and second-degree burglary.1 61 Despite
152. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
154. W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2(f)(2).
155. Id. § 16-3C-5(a).
156. CAL. HE THi AND SAFETY CODE § 199.99(e) (Deering 1990).
157. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
158. See generally Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (inmates have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in their cells).
159. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
160. 529 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Co. Ct. 1988).
161. Id. at 430.
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having a prior conviction for attempted rape in the first degree, 162
he was allowed to plead guilty to the same crime in full satisfaction
of the charges against him. 6 As a result of his prior conviction,
he had spent a substantial number of years in the state peniten-
tiary.164
The defendant opposed the testing on Fourth Amendment search
and seizure grounds, claiming further that a positive result could
expose him to additional criminal prosecution for depraved indif-
ference murder.161 In granting the victim's request to have the de-
fendant tested for the HIV virus, the court noted that there was
sufficient evidence in the indictment record to establish that the de-
fendant exposed the victim to his bodily fluids. 166 The court also
took judicial notice of several facts, including that antibodies might
not be detected in the victim for several months or years 67 and that
HIV exposure is markedly more prevalent among prison populations
than the general population. 68 The court brushed aside the defen-
dant's Fourth Amendment defense, finding that the proposed search
was entirely reasonable because it was the "intelligent, humane, log-
ical, and proper course of action under the circumstances.' 169 The
court defined the scope of the intrusion into the defendant's privacy
as being restricted to the intrusion occasioned by the routine drawing
of a blood sample, which the court described as very minimal and
commonplace. 70 The court declined to broaden the defendant's pri-
vacy interests to include any that might be implicated as a result of
disclosing the test results.
The New York HIV-testing statute was passed shortly after the
decision in Thomas, and the issue has come before the state's courts
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 431. But see notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text. It is the rare case indeed
that a person fails to seroconvert within a year of exposure.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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only once since. In People v. Durham,7' a defendant accused of
rape had announced to the victim that he was an AIDS carrier. 172
The victim subsequently went to the hospital where a Vitullo Kit
sample (a device used to compare DNA fingerprints between the
semen source of a rape and a defendant's blood) was taken from
her. 73 The New York Police Department Laboratory declined to
analyze the kit, however, because policy prohibited such testing upon
an indication that the source of the semen might have AIDS.1 4
Despite the enactment of New York's HIV-testing statute, the
court allowed the defendant to be tested. The court cited an ex-
ception in the testing statute in the state civil procedure rules,' 75
which requires a party to submit to a blood examination in which
the "physical condition of a party is in controversy. 176 The court
ruled that the defendant himself, by announcing that he had AIDS,
had placed into controversy the issue of his physical condition. 77
By virtue of its analysis, the court avoided a direct confrontation
with the spirit of the state's HIV-testing statute. Durham presented
a unique fact pattern, since it is unlikely that most rape defendants
will make a proclamation to the victim similar to the one made in
that case. It will be interesting to see whether the holding in Durham
will be limited to its facts, or whether subsequent actions will serve
to possibly further bypass the strict statutory prohibitions against
mandatory HIV testing. One state judge has already promised to
take advantage of the language in the statute which binds persons,
not courts, to its prohibitions. 78
2. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Roberts: A Federal
Common-Law Precedent
The federal system confronted the issue of compelling rape de-
fendants to be tested for the HIV for the first time in early 1991.
171. 553 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
172. Id. at 945.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 947.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. MacDonald, supra note 1, at 1629.
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In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Roberts,179 the defendant
was alleged to have approached the victim and her male companion
with a gun, forcing the victim to restrain her companion with hand-
cuffs. 1 0 The companion was then asked by the defendant to sexually
assault the woman while the assailant watched.' 81 After the com-
panion declared that he was unable to comply, the defendant raped
the woman at gunpoint and shot her in the neck. 182 She survived,
and escaped to sea where she was picked up by a boat two hours
later. 18 Her companion was killed by a bullet wound to the head,
and later found nude and handcuffed. 8 4 The government requested
that the defendant be tested for HIV and that the results be released
to the victim. 185 The defendant opposed the motion, claiming that
such a test would be an unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. 186
In granting the government's motion, the court noted that since
probable cause existed to charge the defendant with rape, probable
cause also existed to believe that the victim had been exposed to a
known method of transmitting the HIV virus. 187 Since the challenged
perinatal intrusion was more substantial than that associated with
a traditional search, the test of whether a proposed search is rea-
sonable requires balancing "the extent of the intrusion against the
need for it. ' 118
The court identified the government's need to conduct the test
as compelling, 8 9 and proceeded to outline the specific interests in-
volved. First, the government has an interest in protecting the phys-
ical and mental health of victims of sexual assault, both generally
and in their roles as government witnesses. 90 The government's sec-
179. 756 F.Supp 898 (D.V.I. 1991).
180. Id. at 899.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 898.
186. Id. at 901.
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).
189. Id. at 903.
190. Id.
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ond interest is in protecting the health of the general citizenry from
HIV transmission that could be occasioned by the victim engaging
in intimate relations with others. 191
The court held that the government interests in testing out-
weighed the defendant's privacy interests, as the intrusion required
to extract blood was "not significant' '1 92 or "unduly extensive",193
and that since the results of the testing would be revealed only to
the parties and their physicians, the defendant's interest in nondis-
closure would not be significantly infringed. 94
Although the defendant did not advance a constitutional "right
to privacy" defense, 195 the court seemed to anticipate such a defense
being raised in future cases where its precedent might be applied.
The court was careful to classify the government's need in ordering
the test as "compelling"' 96, and emphasized the narrow tailoring of
its remedy in discussing the limited sphere of disclosure.197 Since the
court could have confined its Fourth Amendment analysis to the
individual privacy interests implicated only by virtue of the perinatal
invasion necessary to draw blood for the test (the physical search),
it is difficult to believe that the discussion of the individual privacy
interests in nondisclosure was intended as mere dicta.
In assessing the court's position, it can be noted that there are
really not any new justifications for implementing mandatory HIV
testing for rape defendants, just reformulations of old ones. As has
been previously discussed, ordering such testing in order to assuage
the victim's fears results only in a false sense of security. 98 Given
the current status of treatment for HIV infection, failure to test
rape defendants does not adversely affect the victim's treatment op-
tions, even in the unlikely event the virus has been transmitted. 199
191. Id. at 904.
192. Id. at 901 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989)).
193. Id. (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985)).
194. Id. at 902.
195. Id. at 901. The court characterizes Roberts' Fourth Amendment defense as his "sole ar-
gument."
196. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
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As for the argument that mandatory testing serves the health and
safety of society at large by preventing the spread of AIDS by an
unknowing victim, we can only ask whether society would be better
off in the event of a victim who is actually infected feeling free to
engage in intimate behavior on the basis of a false negative report.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to understate the tragedy of rape in our society.
Innocent victims suffer untold physical and mental anguish at the
hands of their assailants while legislatures and courts do little to
ameliorate the victim's anguish.
Equally tragic is the societal discrimination leveled against per-
sons testing positive for the HIV when the fact of their infection
is made public. Not only are these persons subjected to the prospect
of a slow, horrible death for which there is no cure, but they must
live their remaining precious years as second-class citizens, victimized
by ignorance and prejudice.
When the potentially HIV-infected person is a rape defendant,
that person is vulnerable to a request from his alleged victim which
would force him to undergo testing to detect the presence of the
HIV antibodies. The test is administered at a time not necessarily
of the defendant's choosing, and the results are disclosed to persons
not necessarily having the best interests of the defendant at heart.
A defendant wishing to resist HIV testing in this context may invoke
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as well as the general constitutional privacy safeguards.
Both constitutional analyses require an identification of both the
government's interest in conducting the testing and the individual's
interest in preventing it. An individual possesses privacy interests in
his autonomy and the nondisclosure of intensely personal infor-
mation regarding his HIV status. An individual also has an interest
in avoiding unreasonable searches and seizures of his person. These
interests are readily identifiable. The government's interests are less
clear and not easily articulated.
States have addressed this issue along a continuum of potential
responses. California has enacted a victim-conscious statute which,
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under all circumstances, allows for the testing of a rape defendant
pursuant to the written request of the victim. The constitutionality
of this statute is in question, as it seemingly fails to adequately
consider the rights of the defendant. New York's statute is defen-
dant-conscious, prohibiting nearly all forms of HIV testing absent
the consent of the subject. Since the statute fully considers the rights
of the defendant, it is in all likelihood constitutional. West Virginia's
statute allows mandatory testing, but only of those persons convicted
of rape. Since persons convicted of a crime have a lower expectation
of privacy, the West Virginia HIV testing provisions also appear to
be constitutional.
The courts have been slow to adequately address the legitimate
privacy concerns of the rape defendant. However, there is a small
yet increasing body of caselaw permitting HIV testing of defendants
upon the victim's request.
As tragic as the plight of rape victims unquestionably is, our
legislatures and courts cannot permit their empathy for these persons
to significantly erode our fundamental rights, especially when the
good to be gained from doing so is merely illusory. Our right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, our right to au-
tonomy in making our decisions, and our right to keep intensely
personal information private have been too hard-won to surrender
to chimeric notions of justice.
Raymond S. Franks
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